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INTRODUCTION
An enormous amount of attention has been paid in recent years to the police 
practice of stopping and frisking citizens on the streets as permitted by Terry v. 
Ohio,1 and whether expansive use of Terry constitutes a form of harassment of 
minorities.2 But there is another significant application of Terry that has the 
potential to broaden its impact in the future: the car context.  In 2014, in Navarette
v. California,3 the Supreme Court addressed whether an anonymous tip from a 911
caller alone could justify a Terry stop of a driver, creating reasonable suspicion not 
only for the single incident alleged²running the caller off the road²but for 
ongoing criminality²an inference of driving under the influence.4 The Court 
majority held that it could, as the tip satisfied the two elements of reliability²basis 

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1 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968) (permitting a police officer to stop a suspect when possessing 
UHDVRQDEOH VXVSLFLRQ WKDW ³FULPLQDO DFWLYLW\ PD\ EH DIRRW´ DQG WR IULVN D VXVSHFW LI SRVVHVVLQJ D
³UHDVRQDEOHIHDUIRUKLVRZQRURWKHUV¶VDIHW\´
2 See Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 691 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding a pattern of 
racial profiling by police in New York City Terry stops); AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF ILL., STOP 
AND FRISK IN CHICAGO 3 (2015), https://www.aclu-il.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2015
/03/ACLU_StopandFrisk_6.pdf [https://perma.cc/46VN-KZV4] (detailing prolific racial profiling by 
SROLFHLQ&KLFDJRDQGFRQFOXGLQJWKDWLWFRQVWLWXWHV³DV\VWHPLFDEXVH´RISROLFHSRZHU1RWHWKLV
was a consequence anticipated by the Terry Court.  Terry, 392 U.S. at 17 GHVFULELQJD IULVNDV³D
serious intrusion upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and arouse strong 
UHVHQWPHQW´
3 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014).
4 Id. at 1691 (arguing the reasonableness of concludLQJ WKDW WKH ³DOOHJHG FRQGXFW ZDV D
VLJQLILFDQWLQGLFDWRURIGUXQNGULYLQJ´
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of knowledge and veracity of the informant.5 But each prong of this rather 
IRUPDOLVW DQDO\VLV ZDV FRPSUHKHQVLYHO\ GLVPDQWOHG E\ RQH RI WKH &RXUW¶V JUHDW
modern formalists, Justice Scalia, in a stinging dissent.6 Oral argument in 
Navarette suggested that despite the legalistic manner in which the majority 
opinion was written, the true concern of most of the majority coalition justices was 
far more pragmatic: that serious wrongdoing, be it throwing bombs from a car,7 or 
holding a kidnapped child in the vehicle,8 could not be effectively investigated by a 
police officer except by pulling the car over.  The ineffective effort of Lorenzo 
3UDGR 1DYDUHWWH DQG -RVp 3UDGR 1DYDUHWWH¶V DGYRFDWe to assuage this concern 
during oral argument illustrates how this pragmatic problem, in contrast to the 
formalist rationales the Court ultimately gave, is far harder to rebut.9 This Article 
argues that this pragmatic concern has special application to the car context, and 
for this reason we are likely to see Terry expanded further in the car context in 
future cases.
It does so in two ways.  First, it examines the formalist-pragmatist division of 
the Roberts Court, which is particularly salient in criminal procedure.  Nowadays, 
it is common for legal scholars and media commentators alike to talk about 
Supreme Court cases in terms of a left-right division,10 but they have trouble 
H[SODLQLQJ WKH³GLVRUGHUHG´FRDOLWLRQV11 that appear regularly in the Court.12 But 
importantly, those disordered coalitions are particularly evident in constitutional 

5 Id. at 1688± ³>:@H FRQFOXGH WKDW WKH FDOO ERUH DGHTXDWH LQGLFLD RI UHOLDELOLW\ IRU WKH
RIILFHU WR FUHGLW WKH FDOOHU¶V DFFRXQW  7KH RIILFHU ZDV WKHUHIRUH MXVWLILHG LQ SURFeeding from the 
SUHPLVH WKDW WKH WUXFN KDG LQ IDFW FDXVHG WKH FDOOHU¶V FDU WR EH GDQJHURXVO\ GLYHUWHG IURP WKH
KLJKZD\´
6 See infra Part I.
7 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3±5, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 
12-9490), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2013/12-9490 [https://perma.cc/84WE-KK8Y].
8 Id. at 22±23.
9 For example, when Chief Justice Roberts asked whether a police officer could pull a car 
over in response to a report that a child had just been kidnapped off the streets, SHWLWLRQHU¶VDGYRFDWH
ZDVXQDEOHWRGLIIHUHQWLDWHVXFKDVLWXDWLRQIURPWKDWRIWKHLQVWDQWFDVHDQGKDGWRFRQFHGH³>Z@HOO
<RXU+RQRULI   WKDW¶VDOOWKH\KDYHWRJRRQWKHQXQGHUFlorida v. J.L. WKH\ZRXOGQRW´Id. at 
17±18.  For a more detailed discussion, see infra note 61 and accompanying text.
10 See Lee Epstein & Tonja Jacobi, Super Medians, 61 STAN. L. REV. 37, 44±45 (2008) 
³2QFH D WHUP EDQGLHG DERXW DOPRVW H[FOXVLYHO\ E\ VRFLDO VFLHQWLVWV RU VWDWLVWLFLDQV WKH µPHGLDQ
-XVWLFH¶KDVQRZHQWHUHGWKHOHJDODQGHYHQSXEOLFOH[LFRQ´
11 Paul H. Edelman et al., Consensus, Disorder, and Ideology on the Supreme Court, 9 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 129, 135 (2012) (defining and describing how to measure the extent to 
which cases defy the usual left-right ordering).
12 Cases that do not follow a left-ULJKWGLYLVLRQDUHGHVFULEHGIRUH[DPSOHDV³RGG-bedfellows 
FRDOLWLRQ RI MXVWLFHV´$GDP/LSWDNNo Majority Rationale in Crime Lab Testimony Ruling, N.Y.
TIMES, June 19, 2012, at A13, and the underlyLQJIDFWVDUHGHVFULEHGDVXQXVXDOLQ³VFUDPEO>LQJ@WKH
XVXDO LGHRORJLFDO DOOLDQFHV´ $GDP /LSWDN Justices Allow DNA Collection After an Arrest, N.Y.
TIMES, June 4, 2013, at A1, A15.
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criminal procedure cases.13 Justice Scalia, one of the most conservative justices 
ever to serve on the Supreme Court,14 often sided with defendants in Fourth 
Amendment cases,15 as well as Sixth Amendment cases,16 and Justice Breyer, one 
RIWKH&RXUW¶VPRVWOLEHUDOMXVWLFHV17 frequently sides with the prosecution in both 
Fourth18 and Sixth Amendment cases.19 Supreme Court judicial behavior is in fact 
better understood not in terms of a single left-right dimension of judicial decision-
making, but in terms of two dimensions, one ideological and one of legal 
methodology.  Importantly, the two dimensions can cut across each other, forcing 
justices to decide between achieving their preferred substantive outcome and 
following their favored methodological approach.  Understood in this way, both 
the majority and dissenting opinions in Navarette, as well as the distribution of the 
justices within those camps, make much more sense.  The superior legal arguments 
of the dissent were unable to persuade the majority justices, liberal and 

13 As well as statutory interpretation cases²see Joshua B. Fischman & Tonja Jacobi, The 
Second Dimension of the Supreme Court, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1671, 1704 (2016) (discussed in 
detail infra Part II).
14 The most commonly used contemporary measure of judicial ideology has Justice Scalia 
with an average score of 2.50, more than one standard deviation (2.14) from the historical average (-
0.06), and second only in conservatism to Justice Thomas, with a score of 3.52.  Andrew D. Martin & 
Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. 
Supreme Court, 1953–1999, 10 POL. ANALYSIS 134 (2002).  The numbers reported here and 
throughout this Article are based on the Martin-Quinn scores updated as of April 2017 (data available 
at http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/measures.php [https://perma.cc/R569-2QPA]) (updated annually).
15 From his first criminal procedure opinion, Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 324±25 (1987) 
(finding that any unauthorized touching of an object amounts to a search), to more recent cases, e.g.,
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404 (2012) (finding that installing a GPS tracking device on a 
car constitutes a search); Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409, 1414±18 (2013) (finding that the 
special protection of the home renders a dog sniff of the curtilage a search requiring probable 
cause)²Justice Scalia demonstrated this tendency.
16 In both right to jury trial cases and Confrontation Clause cases²see, respectively, e.g.,
Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 362 (2008) (prohibiting hearsay statements by a murder victim due 
WRXQDYDLODELOLW\RIWKHZLWQHVVWRWHVWLI\DVDUHVXOWRIGHIHQGDQW¶VZURQJGRLQJEHFDXVHWKHPXUGHU
was not committed in order to prevent the admission); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 
305, 311 (2009) (prohibiting admission of chemical drug tests without the in-person testimony of the 
scientist who conducted the test).
17 Justice Breyer has an average Martin-Quinn score of -1.13, more than half a standard 
deviation left of the historical center of the Court.  Martin & Quinn, supra note 14.
18 Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2058 (2016) (finding that in the absence of flagrant police 
misconduct, discovery of a valid, pre-existing arrest warrant attenuates any connection between an 
unlawful stop and any evidence found during the stop); Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1958 
(2013) (finding that taking and analyzing a cheek swab of a lawfully arrested VXVSHFW¶V'1$ LV D
reasonable police booking procedure).
19 See, e.g., Giles, 554 U.S. at 396 (Breyer J., dissenting) (objecting to the exclusion of 
evidence out of concern for the effect on domestic violence prosecutions); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 
U.S. 344ILQGLQJDPXUGHUYLFWLP¶VVWDWHPHQWVWREHQRQ-testimonial and thus admissible 
due to the emergency circumstances of the statement and to prevent manipulation of the right to 
confrontation).
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conservative alike, because the majority in that case was largely constituted by 
pragmatists, and the debate at oral argument made clear that those justices were 
worried about hamstringing police in the special context of Terry as applied to 
cars.
Second, once the significance of pragmatism is considered in this area, much 
of the doctrine makes more sense and the exceptionalism of cars under Terry
becomes evident, as does the likely future path of Terry in the car context.  The 
Court has addressed in detail the differences between cars and other types of 
searches and seizures in crafting four automobile-related exceptions to the warrant 
requirement;20 yet little analysis has been given to how different Terry stops, and 
developing reasonable articulable suspicion (RAS) to justify such stops, are in the 
car context.  But there is good pragmatic reason to think that Terry car stops and 
Terry street stops are meaningfully different, and reason to think that the Court 
thinks so too, even though it has not articulated the difference.21
When police officers have a suspicion of wrongdoing by a person on the 
street, they can undertake a limited seizure in the form of a Terry stop, but they can 
also simply observe the person or engage the suspect in voluntary conversation, 
neither of which requires any suspicion.22 In contrast, when police suspect 
wrongdoing by the driver of an automobile, it is not physically possible for police 
to engage the suspect in voluntary conversation because the person is driving²to 

20 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970) (recognizing a general automobile exception 
to the warrant requirement); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 445 (1981) (extending the search 
incident to arrest exception to contemporaneous searches of the passenger compartment of a vehicle).  
But see Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 332 (2009) (ruling that police officers must demonstrate an 
actual and continuing threat to their safety posed by an arrestee, or a need to preserve evidence 
related to the crime of arrest, to meet the search incident to arrest exception in the car context); 
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1033 (1983) (permitting a Terry frisk or protective sweep of a car 
without probable cause but subject to RAS); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 364 (1976) 
(permitting police to inventory a vehicle that is lawfully impounded without first obtaining a 
warrant).
21 While it is possible that the Chief Justice was simply confused between the car exception to 
the warrant requirement and the application of Terry in the car context, arguably instead he was 
testing out whether similar justifications for the automobile exception, i.e. a diminished expectation 
of privacy associated with cars, California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), might also justify looser 
rules for Terry stops of cars, when, at oral aUJXPHQWKHVDLG³,ZDVMXVWJRLQJWRVD\ZHKDYHKHOG
that the . . . standards are loosened in the vehicle context because your expectation of privacy is 
GLPLQLVKHG ZKHQ \RX¶UH RXW RQ WKH URDG GULYLQJ DORQJ LQ    D YHKLFOH  'RHV WKDW KDYH DQ\
pertinHQFH"´7UDQVFULSWRI2UDO$UJXPHQWDW1DYDUHWWHY&DOLIRUQLD6&W1R
12-9490).
22 7HUU\Y2KLR86DSSURYLQJ2IILFHU0F)DGGHQ³KDLOLQJ>GHIHQGDQWV@
identifying himself as a police officer, and asking their nDPHV´SULRU WRKDYLQJ5$6 Id. at 32±33
+DUODQ-FRQFXUULQJGHVFULELQJWKHOLEHUW\RIDQRIILFHU³WRDGGUHVVTXHVWLRQVWRRWKHUSHUVRQV´
EXWDOVRDFNQRZOHGJLQJWKHSHUVRQ¶V³HTXDOULJKWWRLJQRUHKLVLQWHUURJDWRUDQGZDONDZD\´Id. at 34 
(White, - FRQFXUULQJ ³7KHUH LV QRWKLQJ LQ WKH &RQVWLWXWLRQ ZKLFK SUHYHQWV D SROLFHPDQ IURP
DGGUHVVLQJTXHVWLRQVWRDQ\RQHRQWKHVWUHHWV´
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stop him is to seize him.23 It is also more difficult to build reasonable suspicion in 
the car context through close observation: on the street, police can observe 
recognized articulable factors such as furtive glances, but this is far harder to do of 
a person in a moving vehicle.  As such, in the car context, if the police are 
suspicious of a driver but do not have reasonable suspicion, they have only three 
options: pull the car over without reasonable suspicion, which is unlawful; allow 
the vehicle to continue and potentially escape further observation, which is clearly 
unacceptable in the more serious examples proposed during Navarette¶V RUDO
argument; or follow the car and observe the vehicle in the hope that the driver 
commits an additional driving offense for which he can be stopped,24 which is both 
time-consuming and effectively raises the standard to one of probable cause.  
There is no middle ground.  The terms of the Terry jurisprudence prior to 
Navarette gave the police much more limited options in the car context; Navarette
created additional policing options, but only by disingenuously applying Terry.
:KDW WKLV PHDQV LV WKDW DOO RI -XVWLFH 6FDOLD¶V DUWIXO UHEXWWLQJ of Justice 
7KRPDV¶VIRUPDODQDO\VLVZDVIRUQRWKLQJ,QWHUPVRIDUJXPHQWDWLRQWKHGLVVHQW
was far more persuasive than the majority, as Part I shows.  But that does not mean 
that, as a policy matter, the Court or society wants drivers who have potentially 
committed serious offenses to be free to go just because the police were not there 
to witness the infraction.  The point of this Article is not to argue whether 
Navarette was right or wrong, but to show how the divisions on the Court mean 
that such distinctions are going to continue to be drawn, absent a considerable 
change on the Court.  With the passing of Justice Scalia, the conservative justice 
most likely to side with the liberals for formalist reasons, and with the liberal 
Justice Breyer willing to side with the conservatives on pragmatist matters, the 
likely ongoing coalition will be the pragmatist liberal Breyer, the pragmatist 
conservatives Justices Alito, Kennedy, and to a large extent Roberts, and the 
extreme conservatism of Justice Thomas.25 That means that scholars who do not 
want to see Terry expanded in the car context need to come up with a pragmatic 
solution, not continue to argue purely formalist positions.  That may be difficult, 
because cars are different, as the Court has recognized in other contexts.  At the 
same time, scholars who favor this expansion of Terry ought to develop more 
FRQYLQFLQJ UDWLRQDOHV IRU WKHLU SRVLWLRQ EHFDXVH WKH PDMRULW\¶V ORJLF ZDV
unpersuasive and it leaves the jurisprudence muddled.  Consequently, the 
Navarette majority provides little guidance as to how the Court can reconcile prior 

23 Id. DWPDMRULW\RSLQLRQ³ZKHQHYHUDSROLFHRIILFHUDFFRVWVDQLQGLYLGXDODQGUHVWUDLQV
his freedom to walk awa\KHKDVµVHL]HG¶WKDWSHUVRQ´
24 This Article uses the male pronoun to refer to the suspect and the female pronoun to refer to 
the police officer and the tipster, both to promote clarity and because the Court generally considers 
issues from the point of view of a presumptively male suspect.  See Jesse-Justin Cuevas & Tonja 
Jacobi, The Hidden Psychology of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 2161, 
2161 (2016).
25 7KHH[SHFWHGSRVLWLRQRI WKH&RXUW¶VQHZHVWPHPEHU -XVWLFH*RUVXFK LVGLscussed infra
text accompanying note 80.
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jurisprudence with other controversies concerning Terry stops in the car context 
that are currently being faced by lower courts.26 Understanding the importance of 
pragmatism to many of the Supreme Court justices will help predict similar future 
cases.
Part I discusses the majority and dissenting opinions in Navarette and shows 
that the formalist arguments of the majority are unpersuasive.  Part II proposes that 
pragmatic concerns actually drove most of the majority justices to permit Terry 
stops in cases where police have only an anonymous tip.  It first examines the 
extent to which the Roberts Court justices are formalist or pragmatist in general, 
and shows that the four justices wKR MRLQHG 7KRPDV¶VPDMRULW\ RSLQLRQ DUH WKH
most pragmatist on the Court; it then shows how those justices expressed highly 
pragmatist concerns at oral argument in Navarette.  Part III argues that there is 
good reason to treat Terry differently in the car context, both for the pragmatic 
reasons expressed by the justices in Navarette and for other reasons, including 
looking ahead to likely future cases.  The Conclusion considers the different 
options for dealing with the fact that cars do present a different context for Terry.
I. WHEN AN ANONYMOUS TIP IS NOT REALLY ANONYMOUS
In Navarette, an anonymous 911 caller alleged that a vehicle had run her off 
the road, described the specific spot on the highway where the incident had 
happened, gave the license plate of the vehicle, and claimed that the incident had 
occurred within five minutes of the report.27 Thirteen minutes after receiving 
notice of the call, a California Highway Patrol officer spotted the vehicle nineteen 
miles from the specified location, and within five minutes had pulled the truck 
over.  On approaching the vehicle, both the officer who conducted the stop and a 
backup officer who had arrived reported smelling marijuana, and a search of the 
truck bed revealed thirty pounds of marijuana.28 The complex question that these 
simple facts raise is whether an anonymous tip alone can provide RAS for a stop, 
either generally or in this particular context.
Although information from the public can be relevant to RAS,29 ordinarily, 
without more, an anonymous tip by itself is inadequate.30 Yet occasionally a tip 
IURP DQ DQRQ\PRXV VRXUFH DORQH FDQ FRQVWLWXWH 5$6 LI LW VXSSOLHV ³VXIILFLHQW

26 See infra text accompanying notes 93±111.
27 Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686±87 (2014).
28 Id. at 1687.
29 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972) (finding that RAS need not be based solely 
on DQRIILFHU¶VSHUVRQDOREVHUYDWLRQDQGWKDWLQIRUPDQWV¶WLSVFDQFRQVWLWXWHUHOHYDQWLQIRUPDWLRQ
30 $ODEDPD Y :KLWH  86    ³DQ DQRQ\PRXV WLS DORQH VHOGRP
GHPRQVWUDWHVWKHLQIRUPDQW¶VEDVLVRINQRZOHGJHRUYHUDFLW\LQDVPXFKDVRUGLQDU\ citizens generally 
do not provide extensive recitations of the basis of their everyday observations and given that the 
YHUDFLW\ RI SHUVRQV VXSSO\LQJ DQRQ\PRXV WLSV LV µE\ K\SRWKHVLV ODUJHO\ XQNQRZQ DQG
XQNQRZDEOH¶´TXRWLQJ,OOLQRLVY*DWHV86213, 237 (1983)).
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LQGLFLDRIUHOLDELOLW\WRSURYLGHUHDVRQDEOHVXVSLFLRQ´31 In Alabama v. White, the 
anonymous tipster not only provided numerous details, but also predicted behavior 
by the suspect, and the police subsequently corroborated some of those details, 
although not others.32 Thus the extent and corroborated accuracy of the 
information that the anonymous tipster provided suggested a familiarity with the 
suspect that indicated reliability; and although each element predicted by the tip 
ZDVLQQRFHQWWKDWIDPLOLDULW\ZLWKLQQRFHQWLQIRUPDWLRQ³LPSDUWHGVRPHGHJUHHRI
UHOLDELOLW\´ WR WKH DOOHJDWLRQV RI FULPLQDOLW\ PDGH E\ WKH WLSVWHU33 However, in 
reaching this conclusion, the White Court specified that the case was a close one.34
Thus, the tip in Navarette would have to provide a similar indicia of reliability in 
order to make it over the line.
Arguably, instead, the tip in Navarette more closely resembled the tip that 
failed to meet the RAS standard in J.L..  As the Court had previously warned when 
recognizing the potentially valuable information contained in a tip:
[T]ips, like all other clues and evidence coming to a policeman on the 
scene, may vary greatly in their value and reliability. . . .  Some tips, 
completely lacking in indicia of reliability, would either warrant no 
police response or require further investigation before a forcible stop of a 
suspect would be authorized.35
In J.L., the anonymous tip that a black teenage boy standing at a specified bus stop 
DQGZHDULQJDSODLGVKLUWZDVFDUU\LQJDJXQ³SURYLGHGQRSUHGLFWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQ
DQG WKHUHIRUH OHIW WKHSROLFHZLWKRXWPHDQV WR WHVW WKH LQIRUPDQW¶VNQRZOHGJHRU
FUHGLELOLW\´36 Although the tip did predict where the boy would be, the Court 
explained that:
$Q DFFXUDWH GHVFULSWLRQ RI D VXEMHFW¶V UHDGLO\ REVHUYDEOH ORFDWLRQ DQG
appearance is of course reliable in this limited sense: It will help the 
police correctly identify the person whom the tipster means to accuse.  
Such a tip, however, does not show that the tipster has knowledge of 
concealed criminal activity.  The reasonable suspicion here at issue 
requires that a tip be reliable in its assertion of illegality, not just in its
tendency to identify a determinate person.37

31 Id. at 327.
32 Id. at 332.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972). 
36 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 271 (2000).
37 Id. at 272 (emphasis added).
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The circumstances of Navarette closely resemble the circumstances of J.L..  
In both, an anonymous tipster gave a description of an alleged wrongdoer and 
reported where that person would be²albeit in Navarette, the accuracy of the 
location had to be inferred from the direction that the truck was traveling and the 
distance likely to have been traversed in that time.  But neither tipster made a 
prediction, because each tip alleged illegality but did not provide any information 
that indicated that the allegation of criminality was reliable.  In White, the 
inference of reliability regarding criminality was indirect, coming from the extent 
and accuracy of the predictions of the innocent information, but it did exist. In 
contrast, in both J.L. and Navarette, there was no information in the tip that in any 
way indicated that the underlying allegation was likely to be true²that is, there 
was nothing in the tip to establish its veracity.  And neither tip displayed 
specialized knowledge not available to any person on the street with a grudge 
against the suspect²that is, there was no indication of basis of knowledge of the 
informant.
The majority in Navarette worked hard to show that the anonymous tipster in 
the instant case met that low threshold,38 however, each element was revealed to be 
TXLWHIOLPV\E\WKHSRZHUIXOGLVVHQW -XVWLFH7KRPDV¶VPDMRULW\RSLQLRQGHHPHG
that the 911 call in Navarette ³ERUH DGHTXDWH LQGLFLD RI UHOLDELOLW\´ WR FRQVWLWXWH
RAS for four reasons.39 First, by reporting that she had been run off the road, the 
caller was claiming eyewitness knowledge; in contrast, in J.L. the tipster did not 
explicitly claim to have seen the gun.40 The dissent responded emphatically that 
WKLVIDFW³VXSSRUWVnot at all itVYHUDFLW\´SRLQWLQJRXWWKDW³>W@KHLVVXHLVQRWKRZ
VKH FODLPHG WR NQRZ EXWZKHWKHUZKDW VKH FODLPHG WR NQRZZDV WUXH´41 That 
criticism seems apt: it is just as easy for a person to lie by reporting that she saw 
something than by reporting that she had been told something.
Second, Thomas deemed that the fact that the truck was found at the expected 
location indicates that the caller was telling the truth because it constitutes a 
contemporaneous report, and compared the report to the excited utterances 
exception to the hearsay rule.42 The dissent pointed out that this neither constituted 
a prediction, since anyone seeing the car could report its location,43 nor, since the 
caller had time to note down the license plate, was it likely that the report had the

38 The threshold was lower than that required in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S., 213, 238 (1983) 
GHFODULQJWKDWSUREDEOHFDXVHVKRXOGLQYROYH³DSUDFWLFDOFRPPRQ-sense decision whether, given all 
WKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQFOXGLQJWKHµYHUDFLW\¶DQGµEDVLVRINQRZOHGJH¶RISHUVRQVVXSSO\LQJKHDUVD\
information, there is a fDLUSUREDELOLW\´RIFULPLQDOLW\DGLIIHUHQFHMXVWLILHGE\WKHORZHUVWDQGDUGRI
5$6 FRPSDUHG WR SUREDEOH FDXVH  $ODEDPD Y :KLWH  86    ³UHDVRQDEOH
suspicion can arise from information that is less reliable than that required to show SUREDEOHFDXVH´
39 Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. at 1683, 1688±90 (2014).
40 Id. at 1689.
41 Id. at 1693 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
42 Id. at 1689 (majority opinion) (comparing FED. R. EVID. 803(1) with FED. R. EVID. 803(2)).
43 Id. at 1693 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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kind of immediacy associated with an excited utterance or present sense 
impression.44 The more damning criticism that the dissent failed to make is that 
although the caller predicted the location of the car, this gave no indication of the 
reliability of the allegation of criminality.  For this reason, it resembled J.L. rather 
than White.
Third, Thomas argued that the use of the 911 emergency system meant that an 
anonymous call is not necessarily truly anonymous.  This is because: first, calls are 
recorded and thus create the possibility of voice identification; and second, some 
limited tracking capacity of at least the geographic location of a caller may now or 
in the future be made by cell phone carriers.45 But the dissent rightly responded 
that this should not matter unless it is reasonable to conclude that the caller was 
aware of this possible tracking, as that will shape whether or not she was likely to 
be lying.46
Finally, Thomas submitted that while the caller only alleged one isolated 
incident, a police officer could reasonably suspect that the behavior alleged was 
caused by drunk driving, a common cause of erratic driving and an ongoing form 
of criminality.47 The dissent listed a range of possible other explanations, from 
animus to distraction by cell phone, and suggested that any conclusion that drunk 
driving was more likely than the alternatives does not rise to the level of RAS.48
This dispute is more evenly balanced between the two sides: it is essentially a 
battle between two empirical claims, neither of which have any evidence to 
support them.  The dissent also argued, more effectively, that the failure of the 
police to observe any further evidence of drunk driving in the five minutes in 
which they followed the truck before pulling it over essentially discredited the 
tip.49
8QXVXDOO\ WKH PDMRULW\ RSLQLRQ PDGH QR UHVSRQVH WR WKH GLVVHQW¶V ELWLQJ
FULWLFLVPV HYHQ WKRXJK 6FDOLD FRORUIXOO\ DFFXVHG 7KRPDV RI ³VHUY>LQJ@ XS D
freedom-GHVWUR\LQJFRFNWDLOFRQVLVWLQJRIWZRSDUWVSDWHQWIDOVLW\´50 Overall, the 
dissent clearly got the better of each of the four arguments.  Why, then, did four 
other justices sign on to this rather weak opinion?
II. THE PULL OF PRAGMATISM
The answer lies in what the justices in the Navarette majority have in 
common.  It certainly is not ideology: in 2015, the ideological spectrum of the 

44 Id. at 1694.
45 Id. at 1690 (majority opinion).
46 Id. at 1694 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
47 Id. at 1690 (majority opinion).
48 Id. at 1695 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
49 Id. at 1696.
50 Id. at 1697.
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majority coalition spanned more than two standard deviations of the entire 
historical spread of the Court since 1937.51 Ideologically, then, the Navarette
coalition was highly disordered.  Instead, although Thomas wrote the opinion in 
fairly formalistic fashion²hinging the opinion on questions such as identification 
by an eyewitness rather than indirect knowledge²the other justices in the coalition 
are far more pragmatic than formalist, and the concerns driving those justices were 
pragmatic concerns, not formalist criteria.
7R VHH WKDW WKH IRXU MXVWLFHV MRLQLQJ 7KRPDV¶V PDMRULW\ RSLQLRQ DUH
pragmatists, consider Figure 1, created by Fischman and Jacobi.52 It shows the 
voting patterns of the second natural Roberts Court, from the 2010 through 2012 
Terms, scaled by disagreement between pairs of justices.  Much like a fairly 
accurate map can be created by taking a list of distances between cities and 
inferring their relative placements, the voting patterns of the justices, and the 
extent to which they vote together, can be used to scale their relative positions.  
Most often, this is done by simply representing the justices on a single left-right 
dimension, which is typically interpreted as judicial ideology.53 However, judicial 
accounts,54 legal scholarship,55 and even social science analysis,56 suggest that 
legal methodology also shapes judicial behavior.

51 In 2015, Justice Breyer had a Martin-Quinn score of -1.41 and Justice Thomas scored at 
3.14.  Martin & Quinn, supra note 14.  Two standard deviations cover 95% of a normal distribution.
52 Fischman & Jacobi, supra note 13 at 1697.
53 See, e.g., Martin & Quinn, supra note 14.
54 Judges regularly profess to be influenced by judicial methodology, including textualism, 
formalism, purposivism, consequentialism, minimalism, and concerns for judicial role.  See, e.g.,
STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION (2005); 
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT (1987); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil,
57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849 (1989).
55 See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA.
L. REV. 1335 (1998).
56 See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, What Judges Want: Judges’ Goals and Judicial Behavior, 47
POL. RES. Q., 749, 756±57  ³7KHHPSLULFDl evidence mustered by scholars who dismiss this 
legal goal as a consideration for justices is far from conclusive. . . . this evidence establishes only that 
individual justices vote on the basis of relatively fixed policy positions.  In turn, those positions could 
result from a mix of considerations, including the legal goal of accurate interpretation, rather than 
SROLF\ JRDOV DORQH´+HUEHUW0.ULW]HU	0DUN -5LFKDUGVTaking and Testing Jurisprudential 
Regimes Seriously: A Response to Lax and Rader, 72 J. POL. 285 (2010).
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Figure 1: The Roberts Court 2010±12 Terms Measured in Two Dimensions
Source: Fischman and Jacobi, supra note 13, at 1697.
These two dimensions are not based on any measured input (such as degree of 
agreement with the government); rather, they are a summary of the pattern of the 
MXVWLFHV¶ YRWHV LQ WKH FDVHV  $V VXFK LW LV XS WR WKH YLHZHU WR LQIHU Zhat the 
dimensions consist of.  Fischman and Jacobi argue that the vertical dimension in 
Figure 1 represents a methodological dimension: essentially the division between 
formalism and pragmatism.57 The most pragmatic justices, then, are Justices 
Kennedy, Breyer, Alito, and Chief Justice Roberts²the four justices who joined 
7KRPDV¶V Navarette majority opinion.  Fischman and Jacobi show that those 
justices regularly vote together in cases that do not divide along traditional 
ideological lines, and that this division is statistically significant in explaining 
judicial votes.58 They also show that cases dividing along methodological lines are 
particularly common in criminal procedure cases.59
To confirm that practical concerns were central for the four justices joining 
the majority opinion in Navarette in particular, we need only look to the oral 

57 Fischman and Jacobi, supra note 13, at 1709.  They define formalists as those who 
JHQHUDOO\ ³SUHIHU FDWHJRULFDO DSSOLFDWLRQ RI UXOHV HYHQ LQ VLWXDWLRQV ZKHUH WKH EDFNJURXQG
justificaWLRQV RI WKH UXOH DSSO\ZHDNO\ RU QRW DW DOO´  Id. They define pragmatists as those who 
³SUHIHUWRDSSO\UXOHVQDUURZO\HVSHFLDOO\LQVHWWLQJVZKHUHWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIDUXOHPLJKWFRQIOLFW
with its purpose.  Thus, pragmatists favor balancing tests and particularized rules, which provide 
MXGJHVJUHDWHUGLVFUHWLRQWRDFKLHYHIDLUUHVXOWVLQLQGLYLGXDOFDVHV´Id.
58 Id. at 1698±1709.
59 Along with statutory interpretation cases.  Id. at 1704.
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arguments.  The first question by the justices, asked within the first minute by 
Chief Justice Roberts, was over such a practicality:
So if the tip . . .  is this car is driving by and throwing bombs out the 
window, okay, every, you know, whatever, 500 yards, the police find the 
car, they have to wait until they see the person actually throw a bomb out 
the window themselves before pulling them over?60
Later, the Chief JusWLFHSUHVHQWHGDQRWKHUKRUULILFK\SRWKHWLFDOWKDWWKH1DYDUHWWHV¶
argument, if accepted, would prevent the police from effectively responding to:
:KDWLIWKHUH¶VQRZD\IRUWKHRIILFHUWRFRUURERUDWHWKHDOOHJDWLRQ"<RX
know, you see . . . somebody on the street grab a young child, throw her 
in the trunk of the car, and then take off.  And somebody calls with an 
anonymous tip saying this fellow, you know, in this car has got a child in 
the trunk.  The police can follow the person, you know, for hours and 
WKH\¶UHQRWJRLQJWRVHHDQ\FRUURERUDWLQJHYLGHQFH&DQWKH\SXOOWKDW
car over?61
7KH 1DYDUHWWHV¶ DGYRFDWH 3DXO 5 .OHYHQ KDG WR DGPLW WKDW WKHUH ZDV QR
distinction between the instant case and the hypothesized scenario.  Clearly 
dissatisfied, Roberts rHSHDWHGKLVTXHVWLRQ³6RMXVW\RXUDQVZHULQWKDWFDVHLV
WKDW WKHSROLFHFDQQRWSXOO WKDWFDURYHU"´62 Kleven could only respond that the 
seriousness of the problem does not create a different test under Terry.  In 
response, Roberts expanded the hypothetical:
,W¶VD   DRQH-lane . . . two-lane road going down, but it merges into, 
you know, an eight-ODQH H[SUHVVZD\  <RX KDYH RQH SROLFH FDU  ,W¶V
going to be hard for that police car to maintain surveillance.  And you 
VD\WKH\¶YHMXVWJRWWROHW them go.63
Kleven repeated his position and Roberts asked the question once again, to 
which Kleven gave essentially the same answer, causing Justice Kennedy to joke, 
³<RXJHWDQ$IRUFRQVLVWHQF\,¶PQRWVXUHDERXWFRPPRQVHQVH´64
It is exactly this kind of common sense concern that the pragmatic majority 
justices seemed to be driven by.  The majority justices raised other pragmatic 
DUJXPHQWV-XVWLFH$OLWRZRQGHUHGKRZXQGHUWKH1DYDUHWWHV¶SURSRVDOLWZRXOG

60 Transcript of Oral Argument at 3±4, Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 
12-9490).
61 Id. at 17±18.
62 Id. at 18.
63 Id.
64 Id. at 19.
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be practical for police to corroborate an anonymous tip in this context.65 Similarly, 
he questioned how a person could report observing drunk driving when they can 
only observe the effects of presumed drunkenness.66 And he queried how the 
police could observe deliberate, rather than alcohol induced, reckless driving when 
the individual can drive better when the police catch up with him, only to return to 
reckless driving when the police are forced to leave him unstopped due to lack of 
RAS.67 Justice Breyer expressed concern about the seriousness of the offense 
alleged and whether that made it unnecessary to turn to the question of drunk 
driving.68 Roberts questioned Kleven about how common the problem of false tips 
actually is,69 and then questioned Assistant Solicitor General Rachel P. Kovner,
arguing in support of the State, about the danger of the Court creating an incentive 
for false tips,70 as well as the danger of the police abusing a more lax rule.71
In contrast, the dissenting justices were concerned with more formal issues 
raised by the case.  At oral argument, those justices raised questions about the 
elements of RAS, which both the majority and the dissenting opinions eventually 
centered on.  Justice Sotomayor repeatedly raised the significance of the report of 
firsthand knowledge,72 and questioned whether the suspicion of running someone 
off the road could be taken to create suspicion of drunk driving.73 They also raised 
slippery slope and line drawing problems: For instance, Justice Scalia questioned 
ZKHWKHU UHSRUWV RI ³GULYLQJ UHDOO\ LUUHVSRQVLEO\´ RU FXWWLQJ D SHUVRQ RII LQ WKHLU
lane would justify a stop,74 DQG6RWRPD\RUDVNHGZKHWKHU³DQ\PRYLQJYLRODWLRQ

65 Id. DW³:HOOKRZZRXOG\RXFRUURERUDWH LW" /HW¶VVD\ WKHSHUVRQFDOOVXSDQGJLYHVD
name and gives an address?  So what would be necessary?  What would the police have to do then 
EHIRUHWKH\FRXOGVWRSWKHYHKLFOHRWKHUWKDQREVHUYLQJWKHYHKLFOHGRVRPHWKLQJLOOHJDO"´
66 Id. DW³:HOOKRZZRXOGVRPHERG\ZKRREVHUYHVDQRWKHUFDUGULYLQJHYHUEHDEOHWR
say that person was drunk?  All they could REVHUYHLVZKDWWKH\VHH´
67 Id. DW ³1RZ LI WKHSROLFHFDWFKXSZLWK WKDWSHUVRQRIFRXUVH WKHSHUVRQ¶VJRLQJ WR
VORZ GRZQZKLOH WKH SROLFH IROORZ WKH SHUVRQ $QG WKHQZKHQ WKH SROLFH GHFLGH WR VWRS WKH\¶UH
going to go back to engaging in WKLVLQWHQWLRQDOH[WUHPHO\GDQJHURXVFRQGXFW´
68 Id. at 55± ³, PHDQ RQ PDQ\ VHFWLRQV RI WKDW URDG LQ 0HQGRFLQR &RXQW\ \RX GULYH
VRPHRQHRIIWKHURDGWKH\DUHGHDG´
69 Id. DW³'RZHKDYHDQ\LQGLFDWLRQWKDWWKLVLVDVHULRXVSUREOHP"7KHIDOVHWLSV"´
70 Id. DW³,¶PWDONLQJDERXWWKHFRQFHUQWKDW\RXZDQWWRKDYHWKHSROLFHSXOORYHUSHRSOH
WKDW\RXGRQ¶WOLNHZKHUH\RXNQRZVRPHERG\¶VJRWVRPHWKLQJEDGLQWKHFDUDQG\RXGRQ¶WOLNHLW
DQGVR\RX¶UHJRLQJWRWDNHDGYDQWDJHRIWKHIDFW WKDWWKHSROLFHGRQ¶WKDYHWRREVHUYHDQ\WKLQJDQG
\HW\RXFDQVWLOOJHWWKHPWRSXOORYHUWKLVSHUVRQ´
71 Id. DW³:KDWDERXWWKHGDQJHUIURPWKHSROLFHVLGH",QRWKHUZRUGVWKH\NQRZRUWKH\
suspect that the guy driving the white car has a lot of marijuana in the trunk.  They have no basis for 
pulling him over.  And they say, well, guess what, we got an anonymous tip that he was driving 
HUUDWLFDOO\VRZHSXOOHGKLPRYHU´
72 Id. at 16 (differentiating the instant case from J.L. in which there ZDV ³>Q@R UHDVRQ WR
EHOLHYHWKHFDOOHUKDGSHUVRQDONQRZOHGJH´
73 See, e.g., id. DW³>L@VHYHU\UHFNOHVVGULYLQJGUXQNGULYLQJ"´
74 Id. at 41±42.
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FRXQWV´ LQFOXGLQJ FKDQJLQJ ODQHVZLWKRXW VLJQDOLQJ75 These are slippery slope 
arguments, just as many of the questions posed by the majority were; the 
difference is that the majority justices worried about the effect of such slippage for 
hampering actual crime-fighting, whereas the dissent worried about slippage for 
jurisprudential principles in the Fourth Amendment.
Finally, the justices who ultimately dissented expressed concerns over 
MXULVSUXGHQWLDO FRQVLVWHQF\  6RWRPD\RU DVNHG ³:K\ GRQ¶W ZH MXVW VWLFN WR RXU
JHQHUDOVWDQGDUG´"76 And Justice Kagan posited that considering the seriousness of 
the crime alleged in assessing whether RAS exists, as the government was 
DGYRFDWLQJ³ZRXOGVHHPWRPHWRZRUNTXLWHDVXEVWDQWLDOFKDQJH LQ   )RXUWK
$PHQGPHQWODZ´77
Not only did these justices focus on formal concerns, Scalia made quite 
explicit that he was entirely unconcerned with pragmatic matters, even potential 
extreme consequences of ruling against the government.  Scalia added to the Chief 
-XVWLFH¶V DERYHK\SRWKHWLFDO DVNLQJ ³>:@KDW LI    WKH WLS LV WKLVSHUVRQKDVDQ
atomic bomb given him by Al Qaeda; he is driving it into the center of Los 
$QJHOHV WR   HUDGLFDWH WKHHQWLUHFLW\RND\ /HW LWJR"´78 In response, Kleven 
conceded that would be an extreme circumstance in which there could be an 
exception.  But then Scalia tried to push him to take the extreme formalist position,
VD\LQJ ³, ZDQW \RX WR VD\ WKH &RXUW VKRXOGQ¶W  /HW WKH FDU JR  %\H-bye, Los 
$QJHOHV´79
While Scalia may have been being jurisprudentially and methodologically 
consistent, this line of argument did not help him form a majority coalition, 
because it was exactly this kind of cost of formalism that the majority was 
unwilling to bear²or impose on society.
7KH 5REHUWV &RXUW¶V WKUHH PRVW IRUPDOLVW MXVWLFHV²as seen in Figure 1²
Justices Ginsburg, Scalia, and Kagan, were joined by the methodologically 
moderate Sotomayor, but they could not garner a fifth vote.  Now with Scalia 
gone, it is uncertain if they can even reliably extract a fourth vote.  It is possible 
that Justice Neil Gorsuch may effectively replace Scalia on this issue as both a 
formalist and a conseUYDWLYH  $V RQH FRPPHQWDWRU SXW LW ³+H LV DQ DUGHQW
textualist (like Scalia); he believes criminal laws should be clear and interpreted in 
IDYRURIGHIHQGDQWVHYHQLIWKDWKXUWVJRYHUQPHQWSURVHFXWLRQVOLNH6FDOLD´80
But it is possible that his conservatism may trump his formalism, leading him to 

75 Id. at 49.
76 Id. at 13.
77 Id. at 37.  See also id. DW³>E@XWDOOFULPHUHSUHVHQWVDWKUHDWWo public safety, and yet we 
KDYHWKHVHVWDQGDUGV´
78 Id. at 19.
79 Id. at 23.
80 Eric Citron, Potential Nominee Profile: Neil Gorsuch, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 13, 2017, 12:53 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/01/potential-nominee-profile-neil-gorsuch [https://perma.cc/
3NJ7-WNS6].
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side more often with the State than Scalia did, and look more like Thomas, who is 
more formal but nonetheless has a consistently conservative record in criminal 
procedure cases.81 As such, a fourth vote to stem the expansion of Terry in the car 
context may be difficult to find, and a fifth vote is extremely unlikely, rendering 
the coalition in Navarette highly likely to arise commonly in such cases.  
Consequently, those concerned with an expansion of Terry in the car context need 
to develop pragmatist arguments against that outcome.  But it will be difficult, 
because Terry does apply differently in the car context more generally, not just 
within the confines of Navarette, as the next Part shows.
III. BEYOND NAVARETTE: WHY TERRY IS DIFFERENT IN THE CAR CONTEXT
The facts of Terry exemplify how RAS can ordinarily be built through 
observation.  In the facts of that case, initially the investigating officer, Officer 
0F)DGGHQ KDG RQO\ WKH VRUW RI ³LQDUWLFXODWH KXQFK>@´ WKDW FDQQRW FRQVWLWXWH
RAS.82 He described his initial reaction on observing the three suspects by saying 
³ZKHQ,ORRNHGRYHUWKH\GLGQ¶WORRNULJKWWRPH´83 But McFadden did not need 
to act immediately on having his suspicions raised.  Instead, he observed the men 
from a few hundred feet away for over ten minutes, witnessing two of them walk 
past a store over a dozen times, closely examine it, and confer with a third man.84
These additional facts together were far more suggestive of casing a store for a 
robbery, and McFadden was able to build RAS.85 Thus, a pragmatist need have 
little worry that a police officer will lack the opportunity to intervene on the basis 
of RAS before a crime has actually been committed on the streets.
But that is far harder to do in the car context.  In Navarette, the officers did 
follow the car for five minutes, but were unable to observe any additional 
suspicious behavior.86 Police are necessarily farther away from a suspect who is 
driving, and so they cannot observe D VXVSHFW¶V SK\VLFDO GHPHDQRU IDFLDO
expressions, furtive glances, whispered conversations, etc., as they can a suspect 
on the street.  Essentially, they can only observe the state of his vehicle or the 
quality of his driving.  That effectively means that police officers are restricted to 
building RAS on the basis of factors such as illegal lane changes, observed 

81 For example, writing the majority opinions in Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 846 
(2006) (permitting suspicionless searches of parolees), and Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 822±
23 (2002) (permitting suspicionless drug testing of school students involved in extracurricular 
activities).
82 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968).
83 Id. at 5.
84 Id. at 6.
85 :LWKWKHVHDGGLWLRQDOIDFWVWKH&RXUWFRQFOXGHGWKDW³,WZRXOGKDYHEHHQSRRUSROLFHZRUN
indeed for an officer of 30 yHDUV¶ H[SHULHQFH LQ WKH GHWHFWLRQRI WKLHYHU\ IURP VWRUHV LQ WKLV VDPH
QHLJKERUKRRGWRKDYHIDLOHGWRLQYHVWLJDWHWKLVEHKDYLRUIXUWKHU´Id. at 23.
86 Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1686±87 (2014).
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reckless driving, or lack of registration.  But these examples, and most facts that 
are likely to be observed in this context, constitute probable cause to believe a 
crime is being committed, not reasonable suspicion.  The Navarette decision 
essentially responded to the fact that, as a practical matter, police will effectively 
need probable cause to stop a suspicious vehicle, by instead deeming that RAS can 
be established without evidence of criminality, since subtle clues of criminality 
cannot effectively be garnered in the car context.
Furthermore, on the street, police officers are not restricted to simple 
observation.  They can interact with the suspect directly, to the extent that the 
suspect voluntarily cooperates.  Conversation, generally in the form of questioning, 
can lead to incriminating statements.  Such conversations can also lead to police 
officers observing suspicious conduct based upon circumstances that would not be 
apparent to an officer observing from a distance.  For instance, an officer may see 
DEXOJHFRQVLVWHQWZLWKDJXQLQWKHVXVSHFW¶VSRFNHWRUVKHPD\VPHOOPDULMXDQD
or some other illegal substance emanating from the suspect; or she may observe his 
dilated pupils or other signs of drunkenness or intoxication.  These suspicious 
characteristics and forms of conduct are difficult or impossible to observe from the 
distance between two vehicles.
Even if the suspect on the street does not cooperate, the act of not voluntarily 
cooperating can also provide information relevant to building RAS.  For instance, 
running away from the police is relevant to RAS, and can even provide RAS alone 
if it occurs in a high crime neighborhood.87 Alternately, the suspect failing to meet 
the eye of police can be characterized as furtive glances, a very common factor in 
RAS.88
In the car context, a vehicle can flee from police, but differentiating between 
fleeing and simply continuing driving is made difficult unless the car speeds away, 
changes lanes quickly, or makes other such diversionary maneuvers.  
Consequently, once again, in the car context police have to rely on factors that 
constitute probable cause.  As a result, in the car context police have far fewer 
options to build RAS than they have on the street.
When suspicious of a driver but lacking RAS, police face three unpalatable 
options: First, pull the car over without reasonable suspicion.  That would be 
unlawful, and exclusion would ordinarily apply.89 Second, allow the vehicle to 

87 Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 119 (2000) (ruling that unprovoked flight from the 
police in a high crime neighborhood constitutes reasonable suspicion).
88 Furtive glancing is one of the most common factors relied on by New York police officers 
to justify a stop, reported in over half of documented stops (51.85%), second only to the area having a 
high incidence of crime (58.75%).  Tonja Jacobi, Song Richardson & Gregory Barr, The Attrition of 
Rights Under Parole, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 887, 961 (2014).  Of those stops, police documented on 
average only 1.6 factors, making furtive gestures, despite constituting a highly subjective and 
arguably minimally probative factor of suspicion, enormously significant in justifying RAS.  Id.
89 Subject to any good faith exception, see, e.g., Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 
H[SDQGLQJWKHJRRGIDLWKH[FHSWLRQWRWKHH[FOXVLRQDU\UXOHWRLQFOXGHDQRIILFHU¶VUHDVRQDEOH
mistake of law), or lack of marginal deterrence of applying the exclusionary rule, Herring v. United 
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continue and potentially escape further observation.  That option was unacceptable 
to Navarette¶V PDMRULW\ DV LOOXVWUDWHG E\ WKH OLVW RI KRUULEOHV UDLVHG DW RUDO
argument.  Or third, follow the car and observe the vehicle in the hope that the 
driver commits an additional driving offense for which it can be stopped.  That 
option is both resource- and time-consuming and also effectively raises the 
standard for Terry vehicle stops to one of probable cause.  Without Navarette,
there was no middle ground.  With Navarette, police have additional options to 
prevent highly undesirable outcomes, be it facing exclusion of evidence, allowing 
criminals to escape with kidnapped children, or effectively preventing police from 
relying on Terry¶V ORZHU 5$6 VWDQGDUG  %XW LQ GRLQJ VR Navarette clearly 
expanded RAS to circumstances without strong indicia of criminality, at least in 
the car context.
The opinion gave no explicit recognition that its ruling was confined to the car 
context, and so it may be that Navarette expanded Terry more generally.  
However, the differences described in this Part are unlikely to spur at least the 
liberal Justice Breyer to apply that expansion beyond the car context.  And even 
the more conservative justices seemed at Navarette¶VRUDODUJXPHQW LIQRW LQ WKH
opinion, to recognize the exceptionalism of the car context.  They made comments 
and asked questions that impliedly referred to the second and third of the trifecta of 
unpleasant options described above.  Justice Alito illustrated the sway of wanting 
WRDYRLGWKHVHWZRRSWLRQVZKHQKHFULWLFL]HGWKH1DYDUHWWHV¶DGYRFDWHIRUPDNLQJ
ZKDW$OLWRFRQVLGHUHGDQH[SDQVLYHDUJXPHQWVD\LQJ³ZKDW\RX¶UHVD\LQJLVWKH\
really can never stop a vehicle no matter what kind of a tip they get, unless they 
VHHWKHYHKLFOHFRPPLWWLQJDQLOOHJDODFW´90 That is, either the police have to let 
the vehicle go or find probable cause.  Advocate Kleven and Justice Scalia 
UHOXFWDQWO\GURYHKRPH$OLWR¶VSRLQWE\ IXUWKHUGHVFULELng the second unpleasant 
option: In developing the point that the tip must show criminality, not simply 
UHOLDELOLW\UHJDUGLQJLQQRFHQWIDFWV6FDOLDVDLG³)ROORZLQJWKHFDULVJRLQJWRGR
WKHP QR JRRG DV WRZKHWKHU KH GURYH    VRPHERG\ RII WKH URDG´91 .OHYHQ¶V
DQVZHU LOOXVWUDWHG WKHSUDFWLFDOSUREOHP ³7KH\¶UHQRWJRLQJ WRSURVHFXWH IRU WKH
reckless driving that allegedly took place 19 miles away . . . [given that] the person 
ZKR¶VPDNLQJWKHFODLPLVQRZKHUHWREHIRXQG´92
As such, it is unlikely that Navarette applies to all Terry stops.  In fact, it may 
only apply to the narrow circumstances that Navarette directly covered: deeming 
police to have RAS based solely on an anonymous tip whose only evidence of 
criminality is that the alleged wrongdoing was claimed by the potentially 
unreliable tipster to have occurred in front of her.  But cases are already arising 

States, 555 U.S. 135, 147±4UXOLQJWKDWDQ\DSSOLFDWLRQRIWKHH[FOXVLRQDU\UXOHPXVW³SD\
LWVZD\´LQWHUPVRIPDUJLQDOGHWHUUHQFHRISROLFHPLVFRQGXFW
90 Transcript of Oral Argument at 8, Navarette v. California, 134 S.Ct. 1683 (2014) (No. 12-
9490).
91 Id. at 25.
92 Id. at 25±26.
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where other expansions of Terry can be expected in the car context.  But by 
plugging a practical hole with jurisprudential fudging, the Navarette majority 
opinion provides little direction for future courts in addressing similar issues.
The potential broader application of judicial attempts to avoid the first 
undesirable option²simply letting the potential wrongdoer go without further 
investigation, due to the limitations of the car context²is illustrated by a recent 
cert petition.  In Gilliam v. Nebraska, the Court was asked to consider:
Whether an individual inside a parked vehicle is seized within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
ZKHQ D SROLFH RIILFHU DFWLYDWHV D FUXLVHU¶V HPHUJHQF\ OLJKWV ZKLOH
positioned directly behind the parked vehicle, approaches the vehicle, 
knocks on the window of the vehicle, and directs the occupant to roll 
down the window.93
This remains an open question because the Supreme Court denied the petition for 
cert.94 The case is nevertheless worth discussing, not only to see how other judges 
are attempting to avoid the first option, but also because in doing so, the lower 
court has arguably further expanded Terry in the car context.
In State v. GilliamSROLFHUHFHLYHGDWLSWKDWDFDUZDV³SDUNHGSDUWLDOO\RQWKH
FXUE DQG SDUWLDOO\ RQ WKH VWUHHW´ LQ D VSHFLILHG ORFDWLRQZKHQ WKH SROLFH RIILFHU
arrived, the car was not where it had been described but instead was found on a 
nearby street, parked lawfully.95 Officer Wagner parked behind the vehicle, 
DFWLYDWHG KLV SDWURO XQLW¶V RYHUKHDG OLJKWV H[LWHG KLV SDWURO FDU NQRFNHG RQ WKH
window, and directed driver Gilliam to roll down his window.96 When Gilliam 
FRPSOLHG :DJQHU REVHUYHG ³D VWURQJ RGRU RI DOFRKRO RQ KLV EUHDWK ZDWHU\
EORRGVKRW H\HV DQG VOXUUHG VSHHFK´97 Wagner then conducted a DUI 
investigation and arrested Gilliam for DUI; Gilliam sought suppression of all 
observations by Wagner on the basis that he was already seized without RAS when 
Wagner had approached the vehicle.98
The Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that the initial interaction between 
Gilliam and Wagner was not a seizure but rather a consensual encounter involving
YROXQWDU\ FRRSHUDWLRQ DQG VR :DJQHU¶V REVHUYDWLRQV FRXOG EH XVHG WR EXLOG
reasonable suspicion, which he had by the time he began his DUI investigation.99

93 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Gilliam v. Nebraska, 137 S. Ct. 371 (2016) (No. 15-
1384).
94 State v. Gilliam, 874 N.W.2d 48 (Neb. 2016), cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 371 (2016) (mem.).
95 Id. at 52.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 52±53.
99 Id. at 52±53, 59±60.
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It pointed to the absence of any indication of threat by the officer,100 that Gilliam 
was in a public place, was approached by Wagner alone and on foot, without 
:DJQHU ³GLVSOD\>LQJ@ KLV ZHDSRQ XV>LQJ@ D IRUFHIXO WRQH RI YRLFH WRXFK>LQJ@
*LOOLDPRURWKHUZLVH >WHOOLQJ@*LOOLDP WKDWKHZDVQRW IUHH WR OHDYH´101 Gilliam 
DUJXHGWKDW:DJQHU¶V³DFWLYDWLRQRIKLVSDWUROXQLW¶VRYHUKHDGOLJKWVZDVDVKRZRI
DXWKRULW\ WKDW WUDQVIRUPHG WKH LQLWLDO HQFRXQWHU LQWR D VHL]XUH´102 But the Court 
FRQVLGHUHG WKDW ³WKHUH DUH D YDULHW\ RI UHDVRQV WKDW RIILFHUV PD\ DFWLYDWH WKHLU
RYHUKHDG OLJKWV´ LQFOXGLQJ ³WR DOHUW WKH FDU¶V RFFXSDQWV WKDW WKH\ >DUH@ JRLQJ WR
DSSURDFK WKH YHKLFOH´ DQG WR DYRLG WKH RIILFHU KDYLQJ WR SXW KLPVHOI DW ULVN E\
approaching a parked car late at night without adequate illumination.103 It ruled 
that a reasonable person would understand that there are such various reasons for 
an officer activating his lights, and so the reasonable person would not believe 
himself not free to leave.104
It is difficult to credit the claim that a reasonable person would feel free to 
exit the vehicle and walk away, or else to ignore the knock of the police on his 
window, when an officer has approached after triggering her emergency lights.  
Both appellate and state courts have ruled that the activation of emergency lights 
³XQTXHVWLRQDEO\TXDOLILH>V@DVDVKRZRIDXWKRULW\´105 even though an officer may 
have done so purely as a safety precaution,106 DQG WKDW ³>D@ UHDVRQDEOH SHUVRQ

100 6XFKDV³WKHWKUHDWHQLQJSUHVHQFHRIVHYHUDORIILFHUVWKHGLVSOD\RIDZHDSRQE\DQRIILFHU
VRPHSK\VLFDOWRXFKLQJRIWKHFLWL]HQ¶VSHUVRQRUWKHXVHRIODQJXDJHRUWRQHRIYRLFHLQGLFDWLQJWKH
FRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHRIILFHU¶VUHTXHVWPLJKWEHFRPSHOOHG´Id. at 55.
101 Id.
102 Id. at 54.
103 Id. at 54±56 (quoting United States v. Clements, 522 F.3d 790, 794 (7th Cir. 2008)).  This 
reasoning highlights another pragmatic concern that the Supreme Court has previously worried about: 
the special danger to the police in the car context.  In United States v. Robinson, the Court stressed 
WKHVSHFLDOGDQJHUWRSROLFHRIILFHUVZKHQVWRSSLQJDSHUVRQLQDQDXWRPRELOHFLWLQJVWDWLVWLFVWKDW³D
significant percentage of murders of police officers occur[] when the officers are making traffic 
VWRSV´86Q
104 Gilliam, 874 N.W.2d at 54±56.
105 United States v. Griffin, 652 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2011); State v. Walp, 672 P.2d 374, 
375 (Or. Ct. App. 1983) ³$UHDVRQDEOHSHUVRQZRXOGQRW IHHO IUHH to drive away once the officer 
WXUQHGRQ WKHHPHUJHQF\ OLJKWV 8VHRI WKHRYHUKHDG OLJKWVZDV D VXIILFLHQW VKRZRI DXWKRULW\´ WR
constitute a Terry stop); State v. Yeargan, 6:G7HQQ³:KHQDQRIILFHUWXUQV
on his blue lights, he oUVKHKDVFOHDUO\LQLWLDWHGDVWRS´ State v. Burgess, 657 A.2d 202, 203 (Vt. 
 ILQGLQJ WKDW ³WKH FRQGXFW RI WKH SROLFH LQ GLVSOD\LQJ EOXH OLJKWV DIWHU SXOOLQJ LQ EHKLQG
GHIHQGDQW¶VVWRSSHGYHKLFOHFRQVWLWXWHGDVWRS´6WDWHY6WURXG3G, 318 (Wash. Ct. App. 
 ILQGLQJ WKDW VXVSHFW ZDV VHL]HG ³DW WKH PRPHQW WKH RIILFHUV SXOOHG XS EHKLQG WKH SDUNHG
YHKLFOHDQGVZLWFKHGRQWKHIODVKLQJOLJKW´
106 Brooks v. State, 745 So.2d 1113, 1113±14 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (determining that even
if WKH OLJKWVZHUH DFWLYDWHG DV D VDIHW\ SUHFDXWLRQ ³D UHDVRQDEOH SHUVRQ XQGHU VXFK FLUFXPVWDQFHV
ZRXOGQRW KDYHEHOLHYHGKHRU VKHZDV IUHH WR OHDYH DQG WHUPLQDWH WKH HQFRXQWHU´); Burgess, 657
A.2d at 203 (considering that police may have activated the lights out of a subjective intent to 
promote safety, but the reasonable person would nevertheless consider themselves stopped).
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
would not feel free to drive away once the officer turned on the emergency 
OLJKWV´107 Others have explicitly pointed to the absence of activated emergency
lights as evidence against a seizure.108 However, this raises the difficult question 
of how a police officer who wishes to avoid unlawfully stopping a person she 
suspects of driving under the influence can nonetheless effectively investigate that 
potential crime, and do so without endangering her own safety.  How can a 
studious police officer engage a suspect in voluntary cooperation in this context 
without making the reasonable person feel he is not free to leave or not engage 
with the officer?  A pragmatic Supreme Court is unlikely to direct the police 
officer to approach the car without activating lights that may be necessary to 
HQVXUH WKH RIILFHU¶V VDIHW\109 nor is it likely to tell police officers they cannot 
investigate such a crime, given the high rate of deaths associated with driving 
under the influence,110 nor will it tell police officers to make a stop without RAS.  
As such, the same undesirable three options arise in the car context even when the 
car is stopped.
The solution the Court crafted in Navarette to this trilemma was to tweak the 
standard of RAS in the car context by claiming, not very convincingly, that an 
anonymous call is not really anonymous;111 as such, all a tipster needs to do to 
make a 911 call reliable is to say that she saw the (potentially fabricated) incident.  
But that does not really address the central problem: that the practice Terry
authorized, and the reasons animating its authorization, play out differently in the 
car context.  In a car, unlike on the streets, police are often unable to build RAS, 
and have to choose between three unpleasant options: unlawfully stop the car 
without reasonable suspicion; permit the driver to avoid further investigation and 
so risk the dire possibilities considered during Navarette¶VRUDODUJXPHQt; or follow 
the car in the hope of building probable cause.
Thus, those who are unhappy with Navarette should be wary of future cases 
that the Court takes concerning vehicles, as it is quite likely that the pragmatic 
justices will create another workaround that expands Terry without acknowledging 

107 Walp, 672 P.2d at 375.
108 Miller v. Harget, 458 F.3d 1251, 1257 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding the officer did not do 
anything that ZRXOGDSSHDUFRHUFLYHWRDUHDVRQDEOHSHUVRQVXFKDV³GUDZ>LQJ@KLVJXQJLY>LQJ@DQ\
GLUHFWLRQVWR>VXVSHFW@RUDFWLYDW>LQJ@KLVURRIOLJKWV´
109 ,QIDFWWKHIRXUMXVWLFHVMRLQLQJ-XVWLFH7KRPDV¶VRSLQLRQLQNavarette explicitly warned of 
the danger RI FUHDWLQJ D ³SHUYHUVH LQFHQWLYH´ IRU SROLFH RIILFHUV WR SRWHQWLDOO\ SXW WKHPVHOYHV LQ
KDUP¶VZD\VRDV WREHDEOH WR LQYHVWLJDWH LQUHVSRQVH WR WKHUXOLQJ LQArizona v. Gant hinging an 
RIILFHU¶VDELOLW\WRVHDUFKDYHKLFOHRQZKHWKHUDVXVSHFWLVIXOO\restrained.  556 U.S. 332, 362 (2009) 
(Alito, J., dissenting).
110 $FFRUGLQJWRWKH&HQWHUIRU'LVHDVH&RQWURODQG3UHYHQWLRQ³>L@n 2014, 9,967 people were 
killed in alcohol-impaired driving crashes, accounting for nearly one-third (31%) of all traffic-related 
GHDWKVLQWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´Impaired Driving: Get the Facts, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND 
PREVENTION (2017), https://www.cdc.gov/motorvehiclesafety/impaired_driving/impaired-drv_fact
sheet.html [https://perma.cc/H8T2-W34D].
111 See supra text accompanying note 45.
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doing so.  The Nebraska Supreme Court, perhaps equally pragmatically-minded, 
did so by finding that Gilliam was not seized, which was contrary to the findings 
of many other courts, and rests on a notion of a reasonable person who is 
remarkably resistant to the pressure of the situation of being approached by an 
RIILFHU KDYLQJ DFWLYDWHG KHU YHKLFOH¶V OLJKWV112 The only other obvious way to 
OHJLWLPDWH2IILFHU:DJQHU¶VFRQGXFWZRXOGEHWRFRQFOXGHWKDWWKHUHZDV5$6Ln
the facts of Gilliam, which would involve stretching the logic of Navarette even 
further.  The majority claimed in Navarette that the tip gave reasonable suspicion 
for an ongoing DUI offense; although the facts of Gilliam also raised suspicion of 
DUI, it is harder to claim that the offense was ongoing, since the car was parked 
and no longer even parked illegally.  Arguably, Gilliam presents even less 
suspicion than J.L., since in J.L. the suspect was where the tip predicted he would 
EHZKHUHDV*LOOLDP¶Vcar was not even where it was reported to be, nor did it any 
longer fit the description of being erratically parked.113
A final way that the car context is special is not only the different 
circumstances of the car vis-à-vis any possible interaction between the police and 
the suspect, but also the different circumstances of the car in terms of the reliability 
of the anonymous tip.  The justices may have less concern about allowing an 
anonymous tip alone to constitute RAS because of a lower expectation that a 911
call about a car is likely to be false.  The Court in J.L. was worried about the ease 
with which a person with a grudge against another could call in a false report 
describing where her adversary is standing at the moment of the report, in hopes of 
the police harassing him.114 Such a vindictive report takes a lot more effort to do 
in the car context: the troublemaker would have to actually follow her prey and 
figure out in which direction he is driving and where an imaginary offense could 
have been committed.  For instance, a false claim of the kind made in Navarette
that an individual had driven the caller off the road is much harder in a local street 
context, so a false reporter would probably have to wait until her intended target 
had driven to a highway, followed him, and then reported him.  Making such a 
report would involve using a cell phone, rather than a pay phone, with the greater 
risks of identification that involves.115 Given the greater difficulties of this action, 
it makes sense to discount any suspicion of false reporting in the car context more 
than for a similar report on the street.  Thus, Terry applies differently in the car 
context not simply because of restrictions on police response to suspicion, but 

112 See cases cited supra note 105.
113 State v. Gilliam, 874 N.W.2d 48, 52 (Neb. 2016).
114 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266, 272 (2000) (rejecting an automatic exception to the 
reasonable suspicion standard for an anonymous tip regarding a firearm because WKDW³ZRXOGHQDEOH
any person seeking to harass another to set in motion an intrusive, embarrassing police search of the 
WDUJHWHGSHUVRQVLPSO\E\SODFLQJDQDQRQ\PRXVFDOOIDOVHO\UHSRUWLQJWKHWDUJHW¶VXQODZIXOFDUULDJH
RIDJXQ´
115 See Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1689±GHVFULELQJWKH³IHDWXUHVWKDW
DOORZIRULGHQWLI\LQJDQGWUDFLQJFDOOHUV´ZKRXWLOL]HFHOOSKRQHV
110 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol. 15:89

because the difficulty of making false reports in the car context makes the 
likelihood of unfounded reporting considerably lower.
The Navarette majority opinion did not address this practical difference, just 
as it did not extrapolate upon the pragmatic concerns that most of the majority 
justices expressed at oral argument.  Nevertheless, these practical differences 
between police-citizen encounters on the street and such encounters in the car 
context are likely to continue to shape the direction of Terry stop jurisprudence 
going forward.
CONCLUSION
The specific facts of Navarette are likely to become irrelevant shortly, due to 
the sort of technological changes that the majority asserted are already operational.  
Perhaps 911 calls will effectively cease to be anonymous, a fact that people will
become cognizant of, which in turn will affect the assumption of veracity of tips in 
the car context.  But that will not solve the more fundamental problem the case 
highlighted.  It does not take much imagination to contemplate similar scenarios 
that raise equivalent conundrums for pragmatic justices concerned about effective 
and efficient policing in the car context.  This includes only minor tweaks to the 
various terrible possibilities that the majority justices played with at oral argument.  
For example, a caller from a pay phone²who would remain anonymous even 
XQGHU WKHPDMRULW\¶V IDFWXDO FODLPV DERXW FHOO SKRQH LGHQWLILFDWLRQ²could report 
seeing a child being bundled into a car.  Given the concerns expressed by the 
majority justices, it seems highly unlikely that those same justices would insist that 
the police must scout the scene to see if they could figure out who made the call 
before pulling over the car they suspect holds the hostage.  More likely, the justices 
who comprised the majority in Navarette would find a pragmatic solution that 
involves another expansion of Terry, at least as applied to the car context.  The 
facts of Gilliam, which the Court chose not to take up, present another avenue for 
further expansion of Terry in the car context.
There is strong precedent for such pragmatic expansion occurring.  Terry was 
crafted by an exceptionally liberal Court,116 and written by the very liberal Chief 
Justice Warren.117 The liberal Terry Court did not fail to anticipate the likely use 
of the doctrine it was creating.  The opinion provided an unusually frank 
recognition that elucidation of constitutional rights would not prevent police from 
EUHDFKLQJWKRVHULJKWV³ZKHUH WKHSROLFHHLWKHUKDYHQR LQWHUHVW LQSURVHFXWLQJRU
are willing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other 

116 In 1968, the Warren Court had an average Martin-Quinn score of -1.22, well over half of 
one standard deviation more liberal than the Court on average since 1937.  See Martin & Quinn, 
supra note 14.
117 The Chief Justice had a Martin-Quinn score of -1.36, making him the most liberal Chief 
Justice in the post-New Deal era. Id.
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JRDO´118 That is, the opinion recognized the first of the triad of undesirable 
options available to the police under a strict application of the RAS requirements.  
It also forthrightly recognized that criminal procedure rules were unlikely to 
SUHYHQWWKH³ZKROHVDOHKDUDVVPHQWE\FHUWDLQHOHPHQWVRIWKHSROLFHFRPPXQLW\RI
ZKLFKPLQRULW\JURXSVSDUWLFXODUO\1HJURHVIUHTXHQWO\FRPSODLQ´119 at the same 
time as crafting the doctrine that arguably most enables that harassment.120 The 
most liberal Court since the New Deal nonetheless enabled stops and searches with 
a lower level of suspicion than previously recognized, out of a pragmatic 
recognition that police need certain tools available to them in order to operate 
effectively.  Terry came in the context of Court rulings that move-on laws,121
trespass laws,122 vagrancy laws,123 and assembly laws124 were unconstitutionally 
vague.  Terry stops came to fill that gap in police response to suspicious behavior, 
and even such a liberal Court as the Warren Court recognized that need.
Similarly, the far less liberal Roberts Court²but including the liberal Justice 
Breyer²is groping towards recognition that police have special needs in the car 
context due to the limited options available to officers to build reasonable 
suspicion when responding to unfolding situations.  But currently the Court is 
doing so in a disingenuous manner, failing to articulate the special circumstances 
of Terry stops in the car context and pretending that instead its rulings are 
reconcilable with its more restrictive rules on RAS generally.  Those who support 
the direction of empowering police in this manner need to develop more 
convincing rationales that are less jurisprudentially weak.  This could include, for 
instance, a test based on the exigencies created by the mobile nature of cars, 
similar to the arguments initially provided for creating the automobile exception to 
the warrant requirement.125 Those who dislike the direction the Court is taking for 

118 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 14 (1968).
119 Id.
120 Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 691, 691±92 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
121 Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965) (finding that legislation 
making it unlawful for a person to stand or loiter on the street is unconstitutional, though can be read 
more narrowly to cover obstruction).
122 Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964) (ruling that trespass laws that do not 
give fair notice that it is a crime to refuse to leave private premises after being requested to do so are 
prohibited by the Due Process Clause).
123 Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (facially invalidating as 
unconstitutionally vague a law prohibiting vagrancy, both because the ordinance failed to give a 
SHUVRQRIRUGLQDU\LQWHOOLJHQFHIDLUQRWLFHRIZKDWLVIRUELGGHQDQGEHFDXVHLWHQFRXUDJHV³DUELWUDU\
DQGHUUDWLFDUUHVWVDQGFRQYLFWLRQV´
124 Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971) (invalidating a law prohibiting three 
or more people meeting together on a sidewalk or street corner as unconstitutionally vague as it 
contains no ascertainable standard, as well as interfering with constitutionally protected conduct).
125 Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 48 (1970) (justifying the automobile exception on the 
basis that although privacy interests do exist in a car, because it is mobile it is typically not practical 
to get a warrant).
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Terry stops in the car context need to respond with pragmatic solutions of how to 
maintain prior restrictions on RAS while overcoming the dangers of that approach.  
Only this is likely to convince pragmatic liberal justices, such as Justice Breyer, 
who may be amenable to a more rights-protective outcome but who simply cannot 
find a solution that seems palatable.  Simply responding in formal terms, as Justice 
Scalia did, will be to little avail, given these concerns.  We can expect more issues 
raising these dilemmas to come.  Currently the future of the Terry doctrine in the 
car context is still open, but advocates need to be speaking in the right terms in 
order to convince the Court.
